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-rw-r--r--dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-p11-segfault.patch79
-rw-r--r--dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.3.2-CVE-2024-9143.patch193
2 files changed, 193 insertions, 79 deletions
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-p11-segfault.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-p11-segfault.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 59e785c..0000000
--- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.2.1-p11-segfault.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-https://bugs.gentoo.org/916328
-https://github.com/opendnssec/SoftHSMv2/issues/729
-https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/22508
-https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/934943281267259fa928f4a5814b176525461a65
-
-From 934943281267259fa928f4a5814b176525461a65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 13:45:50 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Revert "Improved detection of engine-provided private
- "classic" keys"
-
-This reverts commit 2b74e75331a27fc89cad9c8ea6a26c70019300b5.
-
-The commit was wrong. With 3.x versions the engines must be themselves
-responsible for creating their EVP_PKEYs in a way that they are treated
-as legacy - either by using the respective set1 calls or by setting
-non-default EVP_PKEY_METHOD.
-
-The workaround has caused more problems than it solved.
-
-Fixes #22945
-
-Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23063)
-
-(cherry picked from commit 39ea78379826fa98e8dc8c0d2b07e2c17cd68380)
---- a/crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c
-+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c
-@@ -79,48 +79,6 @@ EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_private_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ENGINE, ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY);
- return NULL;
- }
-- /* We enforce check for legacy key */
-- switch (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey)) {
-- case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
-- {
-- RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
-- EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa);
-- RSA_free(rsa);
-- }
-- break;
--# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-- case EVP_PKEY_SM2:
-- case EVP_PKEY_EC:
-- {
-- EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey);
-- EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, ec);
-- EC_KEY_free(ec);
-- }
-- break;
--# endif
--# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-- case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
-- {
-- DSA *dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pkey);
-- EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, dsa);
-- DSA_free(dsa);
-- }
-- break;
--#endif
--# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-- case EVP_PKEY_DH:
-- {
-- DH *dh = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(pkey);
-- EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(pkey, dh);
-- DH_free(dh);
-- }
-- break;
--#endif
-- default:
-- /*Do nothing */
-- break;
-- }
--
- return pkey;
- }
-
-
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.3.2-CVE-2024-9143.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.3.2-CVE-2024-9143.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5776c78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.3.2-CVE-2024-9143.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+https://bugs.gentoo.org/941643
+https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/c0d3e4d32d2805f49bec30547f225bc4d092e1f4
+
+From c0d3e4d32d2805f49bec30547f225bc4d092e1f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2024 01:02:40 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Harden BN_GF2m_poly2arr against misuse.
+
+The BN_GF2m_poly2arr() function converts characteristic-2 field
+(GF_{2^m}) Galois polynomials from a representation as a BIGNUM bitmask,
+to a compact array with just the exponents of the non-zero terms.
+
+These polynomials are then used in BN_GF2m_mod_arr() to perform modular
+reduction. A precondition of calling BN_GF2m_mod_arr() is that the
+polynomial must have a non-zero constant term (i.e. the array has `0` as
+its final element).
+
+Internally, callers of BN_GF2m_poly2arr() did not verify that
+precondition, and binary EC curve parameters with an invalid polynomial
+could lead to out of bounds memory reads and writes in BN_GF2m_mod_arr().
+
+The precondition is always true for polynomials that arise from the
+standard form of EC parameters for characteristic-two fields (X9.62).
+See the "Finite Field Identification" section of:
+
+ https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/formal-language/itu-t/x/x894/2018-cor1/ANSI-X9-62.html
+
+The OpenSSL GF(2^m) code supports only the trinomial and pentanomial
+basis X9.62 forms.
+
+This commit updates BN_GF2m_poly2arr() to return `0` (failure) when
+the constant term is zero (i.e. the input bitmask BIGNUM is not odd).
+
+Additionally, the return value is made unambiguous when there is not
+enough space to also pad the array with a final `-1` sentinel value.
+The return value is now always the number of elements (including the
+final `-1`) that would be filled when the output array is sufficiently
+large. Previously the same count was returned both when the array has
+just enough room for the final `-1` and when it had only enough space
+for non-sentinel values.
+
+Finally, BN_GF2m_poly2arr() is updated to reject polynomials whose
+degree exceeds `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against
+CPU exhausition attacks via excessively large inputs.
+
+The above issues do not arise in processing X.509 certificates. These
+generally have EC keys from "named curves", and RFC5840 (Section 2.1.1)
+disallows explicit EC parameters. The TLS code in OpenSSL enforces this
+constraint only after the certificate is decoded, but, even if explicit
+parameters are specified, they are in X9.62 form, which cannot represent
+problem values as noted above.
+
+Initially reported as oss-fuzz issue 71623.
+
+A closely related issue was earlier reported in
+<https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/19826>.
+
+Severity: Low, CVE-2024-9143
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25639)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 8e008cb8b23ec7dc75c45a66eeed09c815b11cd2)
+--- a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include "bn_local.h"
+
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
++# include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+ /*
+ * Maximum number of iterations before BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr should
+@@ -1130,16 +1131,26 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ /*
+ * Convert the bit-string representation of a polynomial ( \sum_{i=0}^n a_i *
+ * x^i) into an array of integers corresponding to the bits with non-zero
+- * coefficient. Array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements of the array
+- * will be filled. Return value is total number of array elements that would
+- * be filled if array was large enough.
++ * coefficient. The array is intended to be suitable for use with
++ * `BN_GF2m_mod_arr()`, and so the constant term of the polynomial must not be
++ * zero. This translates to a requirement that the input BIGNUM `a` is odd.
++ *
++ * Given sufficient room, the array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements
++ * of the array will be filled.
++ *
++ * The return value is total number of array elements that would be filled if
++ * array was large enough, including the terminating `-1`. It is `0` when `a`
++ * is not odd or the constant term is zero contrary to requirement.
++ *
++ * The return value is also `0` when the leading exponent exceeds
++ * `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against CPU exhaustion attacks,
+ */
+ int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max)
+ {
+ int i, j, k = 0;
+ BN_ULONG mask;
+
+- if (BN_is_zero(a))
++ if (!BN_is_odd(a))
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+@@ -1157,12 +1168,13 @@ int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max)
+ }
+ }
+
+- if (k < max) {
++ if (k > 0 && p[0] > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS)
++ return 0;
++
++ if (k < max)
+ p[k] = -1;
+- k++;
+- }
+
+- return k;
++ return k + 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+--- a/test/ec_internal_test.c
++++ b/test/ec_internal_test.c
+@@ -155,6 +155,56 @@ static int field_tests_ecp_mont(void)
+ }
+
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
++/* Test that decoding of invalid GF2m field parameters fails. */
++static int ec2m_field_sanity(void)
++{
++ int ret = 0;
++ BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
++ BIGNUM *p, *a, *b;
++ EC_GROUP *group1 = NULL, *group2 = NULL, *group3 = NULL;
++
++ TEST_info("Testing GF2m hardening\n");
++
++ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
++ p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
++ a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
++ if (!TEST_ptr(b = BN_CTX_get(ctx))
++ || !TEST_true(BN_one(a))
++ || !TEST_true(BN_one(b)))
++ goto out;
++
++ /* Even pentanomial value should be rejected */
++ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf2)))
++ goto out;
++ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group1 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
++ TEST_error("Zero constant term accepted in GF2m polynomial");
++
++ /* Odd hexanomial should also be rejected */
++ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf3)))
++ goto out;
++ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group2 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
++ TEST_error("Hexanomial accepted as GF2m polynomial");
++
++ /* Excessive polynomial degree should also be rejected */
++ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0x71))
++ || !TEST_true(BN_set_bit(p, OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS + 1)))
++ goto out;
++ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group3 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
++ TEST_error("GF2m polynomial degree > %d accepted",
++ OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS);
++
++ ret = group1 == NULL && group2 == NULL && group3 == NULL;
++
++ out:
++ EC_GROUP_free(group1);
++ EC_GROUP_free(group2);
++ EC_GROUP_free(group3);
++ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
++ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
++
++ return ret;
++}
++
+ /* test EC_GF2m_simple_method directly */
+ static int field_tests_ec2_simple(void)
+ {
+@@ -443,6 +493,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+ ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_simple);
+ ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_mont);
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
++ ADD_TEST(ec2m_field_sanity);
+ ADD_TEST(field_tests_ec2_simple);
+ #endif
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(field_tests_default, crv_len);
+
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