dev-liba/openssl: sync

6 files changed, 373 insertions, 24 deletions

diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/gentoo.config-1.0.4 b/dev-libs/openssl/files/gentoo.config-1.0.4
index 573a97d..79f6331 100644
--- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/gentoo.config-1.0.4
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/gentoo.config-1.0.4
@@ -77,7 +77,9 @@ fi
 
 # Detect target arch
 machine=""
+submachine=""
 chost_machine=${CHOST%%-*}
+[[ ${CC} == *clang* ]] && submachine="-clang"
 case ${system} in
 linux)
 	case ${chost_machine}:${ABI} in
@@ -95,7 +97,7 @@ linux)
 	#	hppa64*)      machine=parisc64;;
 		hppa*)        machine="generic32 -DB_ENDIAN";;
 		i[0-9]86*|\
-		x86_64*:x86)  machine=x86;;
+		x86_64*:x86)  machine=x86${submachine};;
 		ia64*)        machine=ia64;;
 		loongarch64*) machine="loongarch64 -DL_ENDIAN" system=linux64;;
 		m68*)         machine="latomic -DB_ENDIAN";;
@@ -125,7 +127,7 @@ linux)
 		s390x*)       machine=s390x system=linux64;;
 		s390*)        machine="generic32 -DB_ENDIAN";;
 		x86_64*:x32)  machine=x32;;
-		x86_64*)      machine=x86_64;;
+		x86_64*)      machine=x86_64${submachine};;
 	esac
 	;;
 BSD)
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-mips-cflags.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-mips-cflags.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..111681f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-mips-cflags.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+https://bugs.gentoo.org/894140
+https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/20214
+
+From d500b51791cd56e73065e3a7f4487fc33f31c91c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mike Gilbert <floppym@gentoo.org>
+Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2023 17:56:58 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix Configure test for -mips in CFLAGS
+
+We want to add -mips2 or -mips3 only if the user hasn't already
+specified a mips version in CFLAGS. The existing test was a
+double-negative.
+
+Fixes: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/20214
+---
+ Configure | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Configure b/Configure
+index b6bbec0a85c4..ec48614d6b99 100755
+--- a/Configure
++++ b/Configure
+@@ -1475,7 +1475,7 @@ if ($target =~ /^mingw/ && `$config{CC} --target-help 2>&1` =~ m/-mno-cygwin/m)
+         }
+ 
+ if ($target =~ /linux.*-mips/ && !$disabled{asm}
+-        && !grep { $_ !~ /-m(ips|arch=)/ } (@{$config{CFLAGS}})) {
++        && !grep { $_ =~ /-m(ips|arch=)/ } (@{$config{CFLAGS}})) {
+         # minimally required architecture flags for assembly modules
+         my $value;
+         $value = '-mips2' if ($target =~ /mips32/);
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.0-CVE-2023-0464.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.0-CVE-2023-0464.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dfe83e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.0-CVE-2023-0464.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+commit 2017771e2db3e2b96f89bbe8766c3209f6a99545
+Author: Pauli <pauli@openssl.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 8 15:28:20 2023 +1100
+
+    x509: excessive resource use verifying policy constraints
+    
+    A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions
+    of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains
+    that include policy constraints.  Attackers may be able to exploit this
+    vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers
+    exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service
+    (DoS) attack on affected systems.
+    
+    Fixes CVE-2023-0464
+    
+    Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+    Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
+    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20570)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h b/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
+index 18b53cc09e..cba107ca03 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
++++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
+@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st {
+ };
+ 
+ struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st {
++    /* The number of nodes in the tree */
++    size_t node_count;
++    /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */
++    size_t node_maximum;
++
+     /* This is the tree 'level' data */
+     X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels;
+     int nlevel;
+@@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk,
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+                                              X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
+                                              X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
+-                                             X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
++                                             X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
++                                             int extra_data);
+ void ossl_policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node);
+ int ossl_policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl,
+                            const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c b/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
+index 9d9a7ea179..450f95a655 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
+@@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+                                              X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
+                                              X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
+-                                             X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
++                                             X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
++                                             int extra_data)
+ {
+     X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+ 
++    /* Verify that the tree isn't too large.  This mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */
++    if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum)
++        return NULL;
++
+     node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node));
+     if (node == NULL) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+     }
+     node->data = data;
+     node->parent = parent;
+-    if (level) {
++    if (level != NULL) {
+         if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) {
+             if (level->anyPolicy)
+                 goto node_error;
+@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    if (tree) {
++    if (extra_data) {
+         if (tree->extra_data == NULL)
+             tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null();
+         if (tree->extra_data == NULL){
+@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+         }
+     }
+ 
++    tree->node_count++;
+     if (parent)
+         parent->nchild++;
+ 
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
+index fa45da5117..f953a05a41 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
+@@ -14,6 +14,17 @@
+ 
+ #include "pcy_local.h"
+ 
++/*
++ * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to
++ * a generous default of 1000 nodes.
++ *
++ * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the
++ * door on CVE-2023-0464.
++ */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX
++# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000
++#endif
++
+ static void expected_print(BIO *channel,
+                            X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, X509_POLICY_NODE *node,
+                            int indent)
+@@ -163,6 +174,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+         return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+     }
+ 
++    /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */
++    tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX;
++
+     /*
+      * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3.
+      *
+@@ -180,7 +194,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+     if ((data = ossl_policy_data_new(NULL,
+                                      OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL)
+         goto bad_tree;
+-    if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) {
++    if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) {
+         ossl_policy_data_free(data);
+         goto bad_tree;
+     }
+@@ -239,7 +253,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+  * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
+  */
+ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+-                                    X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
++                                    X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
++                                    X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+ {
+     X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
+     int i, matched = 0;
+@@ -249,13 +264,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+         X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
+ 
+         if (ossl_policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
+-            if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL)
++            if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL)
+                 return 0;
+             matched = 1;
+         }
+     }
+     if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
+-        if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
++        if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
+             return 0;
+     }
+     return 1;
+@@ -268,7 +283,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+  * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+  */
+ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+-                           const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
++                           const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
++                           X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+ {
+     int i;
+ 
+@@ -276,7 +292,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+         X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
+ 
+         /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
+-        if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
++        if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree))
+             return 0;
+     }
+     return 1;
+@@ -307,7 +323,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+     /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
+     data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
+     data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
+-    if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) {
++    if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) {
+         ossl_policy_data_free(data);
+         return 0;
+     }
+@@ -370,7 +386,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+     /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
+     if (last->anyPolicy &&
+             ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy,
+-                                       last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
++                                       last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
+         return 0;
+     return 1;
+ }
+@@ -553,7 +569,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+             extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
+                 | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
+             node = ossl_policy_level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent,
+-                                              tree);
++                                              tree, 1);
+         }
+         if (!tree->user_policies) {
+             tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
+@@ -580,7 +596,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+ 
+     for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
+         cache = ossl_policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
+-        if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
++        if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree))
+             return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+ 
+         if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.0-CVE-2023-0465.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.0-CVE-2023-0465.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a98f7cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.0-CVE-2023-0465.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+commit facfb1ab745646e97a1920977ae4a9965ea61d5c
+Author: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 7 16:52:55 2023 +0000
+
+    Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY is checked even in leaf certs
+    
+    Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we
+    later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf
+    cert was bad.
+    
+    Fixes: CVE-2023-0465
+    
+    Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
+    Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20586)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+index 9384f1da9b..a0282c3ef1 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+@@ -1654,15 +1654,23 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+         goto memerr;
+     /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
+     if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
+-        int i;
++        int i, cbcalled = 0;
+ 
+         /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
+-        for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
++        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+             X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ 
++            if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0)
++                cbcalled = 1;
+             CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0,
+                        ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+         }
++        if (!cbcalled) {
++            /* Should not be able to get here */
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            return 0;
++        }
++        /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */
+         return 1;
+     }
+     if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.0-CVE-2023-0466.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.0-CVE-2023-0466.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a315f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.1.0-CVE-2023-0466.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+commit fc814a30fc4f0bc54fcea7d9a7462f5457aab061
+Author: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 21 16:15:47 2023 +0100
+
+    Fix documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy()
+    
+    The function was incorrectly documented as enabling policy checking.
+    
+    Fixes: CVE-2023-0466
+    
+    Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20562)
+
+diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
+index 20aea99b5b..fcbbfc4c30 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
+@@ -98,8 +98,9 @@ B<trust>.
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to
+ B<t>. Normally the current time is used.
+ 
+-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled
+-by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
++X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
++Contrary to preexisting documentation of this function it does not enable
++policy checking.
+ 
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled
+ by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing
+@@ -400,6 +401,10 @@ The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i.
+ The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_email(),
+ and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get1_ip_asc() functions were added in OpenSSL 3.0.
+ 
++The function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() was historically documented as
++enabling policy checking however the implementation has never done this.
++The documentation was changed to align with the implementation.
++
+ =head1 COPYRIGHT
+ 
+ Copyright 2009-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-3.0.8.ebuild b/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-3.1.0-r2.ebuild
index 5feb2fd..44362f8 100644
--- a/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-3.0.8.ebuild
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/openssl-3.1.0-r2.ebuild
@@ -16,20 +16,22 @@ if [[ ${PV} == 9999 ]] ; then
 
 	inherit git-r3
 else
-	SRC_URI="mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz
-		verify-sig? ( mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz.asc )"
-	#KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc ~x86 ~x86-linux"
-	KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~loong ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc ~x86"
+	SRC_URI="
+		mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz
+		verify-sig? ( mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz.asc )
+	"
+	#KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~loong ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc ~x86"
 fi
 
 S="${WORKDIR}"/${MY_P}
 
 LICENSE="Apache-2.0"
-SLOT="0/3" # .so version of libssl/libcrypto
+SLOT="0/$(ver_cut 1)" # .so version of libssl/libcrypto
 IUSE="+asm cpu_flags_x86_sse2 fips ktls rfc3779 sctp static-libs test tls-compression vanilla verify-sig weak-ssl-ciphers"
 RESTRICT="!test? ( test )"
 
 COMMON_DEPEND="
+	!<net-misc/openssh-9.2_p1-r3
 	tls-compression? ( >=sys-libs/zlib-1.2.8-r1[static-libs(+)?,${MULTILIB_USEDEP}] )
 "
 BDEPEND="
@@ -50,6 +52,13 @@ MULTILIB_WRAPPED_HEADERS=(
 	/usr/include/openssl/configuration.h
 )
 
+PATCHES=(
+	"${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.0.8-mips-cflags.patch
+	"${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.1.0-CVE-2023-0464.patch
+	"${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.1.0-CVE-2023-0465.patch
+	"${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.1.0-CVE-2023-0466.patch
+)
+
 pkg_setup() {
 	if use ktls ; then
 		if kernel_is -lt 4 18 ; then
@@ -88,13 +97,6 @@ src_unpack() {
 }
 
 src_prepare() {
-	# Allow openssl to be cross-compiled
-	cp "${FILESDIR}"/gentoo.config-1.0.4 gentoo.config || die
-	chmod a+rx gentoo.config || die
-
-	# Keep this in sync with app-misc/c_rehash
-	SSL_CNF_DIR="/etc/ssl"
-
 	# Make sure we only ever touch Makefile.org and avoid patching a file
 	# that gets blown away anyways by the Configure script in src_configure
 	rm -f Makefile
@@ -111,6 +113,11 @@ src_prepare() {
 		einfo "Disabling test '80-test_ssl_new.t' which is known to fail with FEATURES=network-sandbox ..."
 		rm test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t || die
 	fi
+}
+
+src_configure() {
+	# Keep this in sync with app-misc/c_rehash
+	SSL_CNF_DIR="/etc/ssl"
 
 	# Quiet out unknown driver argument warnings since openssl
 	# doesn't have well-split CFLAGS and we're making it even worse
@@ -130,14 +137,6 @@ src_prepare() {
 
 	append-flags $(test-flags-CC -Wa,--noexecstack)
 
-	local sslout=$(./gentoo.config)
-	einfo "Using configuration: ${sslout:-(openssl knows best)}"
-	edo perl Configure ${sslout} --test-sanity
-
-	multilib_copy_sources
-}
-
-multilib_src_configure() {
 	# bug #197996
 	unset APPS
 	# bug #312551
@@ -147,11 +146,15 @@ multilib_src_configure() {
 
 	tc-export AR CC CXX RANLIB RC
 
+	multilib-minimal_src_configure
+}
+
+multilib_src_configure() {
 	use_ssl() { usex $1 "enable-${2:-$1}" "no-${2:-$1}" " ${*:3}" ; }
 
 	local krb5=$(has_version app-crypt/mit-krb5 && echo "MIT" || echo "Heimdal")
 
-	local sslout=$(./gentoo.config)
+	local sslout=$(bash "${FILESDIR}/gentoo.config-1.0.4")
 	einfo "Using configuration: ${sslout:-(openssl knows best)}"
 
 	# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/INSTALL.md#enable-and-disable-features
@@ -185,7 +188,7 @@ multilib_src_configure() {
 		threads
 	)
 
-	edo perl Configure "${myeconfargs[@]}"
+	edo perl "${S}/Configure" "${myeconfargs[@]}"
 }
 
 multilib_src_compile() {
@@ -206,6 +209,8 @@ multilib_src_install() {
 	emake DESTDIR="${D}" install_sw
 	if use fips; then
 		emake DESTDIR="${D}" install_fips
+		# Regen this in pkg_preinst, bug 900625
+		rm "${ED}${SSL_CNF_DIR}"/fipsmodule.cnf || die
 	fi
 
 	if multilib_is_native_abi; then
@@ -241,6 +246,17 @@ multilib_src_install_all() {
 	keepdir ${SSL_CNF_DIR}/private
 }
 
+pkg_preinst() {
+	if use fips; then
+		# Regen fipsmodule.cnf, bug 900625
+		ebegin "Running openssl fipsinstall"
+		"${ED}/usr/bin/openssl" fipsinstall -quiet \
+			-out "${ED}${SSL_CNF_DIR}/fipsmodule.cnf" \
+			-module "${ED}/usr/$(get_libdir)/ossl-modules/fips.so"
+		eend $?
+	fi
+}
+
 pkg_postinst() {
 	ebegin "Running 'openssl rehash ${EROOT}${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs' to rebuild hashes (bug #333069)"
 	openssl rehash "${EROOT}${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs"